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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
14060

RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was charged
with interfering with a police officer. Said defendant
pled not guilty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Richard Allen Bradshaw was charged with a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended,
interfering with an arrest made by a law enforcement
officer. He was convicted on that charge in the justice's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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court, Milford precinct, and subsequently by a jury in
the District Count in Beaver County, J. Harlan Bums,
presiding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the jury verdict
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The violation arose from the following facts:
On the evening of March 15, 1974, Officer Cox, while
on duty and dressed in full police uniform (T. 5), observed Richard Allen Bradshaw driving a vehicle down
the main street of town (T. 7). Officer Cox had been
advised by radio that Mr. Bnadshaw's license had been
suspended and therefore proceeded to follow him. Mr.
Bradshaw ignored the flashing red light of the police
car and did not pull over (T. 7). Officer Cox followed
Mr. Bradshaw to a service station, got out of the patrol
car and told Mr. Bradshaw that he would have to write
him a citation for driving with a suspended license (412-28) (T. 7). As Office Cox was writing up the citation,
Mr. Bradshaw paid for his gas, got in his car and drove
away from the station (T. 7). Officer Cox put on his
siren (T. 9) and followed Bcradshaw three blocks to a
motel where he was staying at that time. Both men
got out of their vehicles and Officer Cox told appellant
that he was under arrest for resisting arrest (T. 10).
Mr. Bradshaw approached Officer Cox with an unidentiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fiable object in his hand and pushed him on the chest
(T. 10). As a precautionary measure, Officer Cox drew
his revolver. In response, the appellant turned his back
and walked away from the scene.
A warrant was later issued by the justice of the peace
for the arrest of Mr. Bradshaw under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-305 (1953), as amended:
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes with
a person recognized to be a law enforcement
officer seeking to effect an arrest or detention
of himself or another regardless of whether there
is a legal basis for the arrest."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
IS FINAL AS TO ALL MATTERS EXCEPT
THOSE WHICH RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-14 (1953), provides:
"Appeals — Any person dissatisfied with
a judgment rendered in a justice's court, whether
the same was rendered on default or after trial,
may apply for a new trial or appeal therefrom
to the district court of the county within the
time and in the manner provided by law."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-5 (1953), provides as follows
in pertinent part:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Appeals shall lie from the final judgments of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases
to the district courts, on both questions of law
and fact with such limitations and restrictions
as aire or may be provided by law; and the decisions of the disffcrict courts on such appeals
shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to the above statutes appellant filed an
appeal from the district court challenging the constitionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a single
issue — the constitutionality of the statute. In State v.
Holtgreve, 200 Pac. 894 (1921), the Supreme Court of
Utah explained the extent of this judicial review:
"In view that the case originated in the
justice's court and was appealed to the district
court, whose decisions, except on the validity
of statutes upon which the conviction is based,
are final, this court, under the provisions of our
constitution, may not review errors except those
which relate to or assail the validity of the act
under which appellant was convicted."
Any other issues that appellant raises are done so improperly, and should not be reviewed by this Court.
POINT II.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1953), AS
AMENDED, DOES NOT DEPRIVE APPELDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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LANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEIZURE OF HIS PERSON, AND HIS CONVICTION THEREUNDER SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD.
Appellant contends that Section 76-8-305 is unconstitutional and that his conviction for violation of the
statute cannot therefore be upheld.
Section 76-8-305 was enacted by the Utah legislature
in 1973 and provides as follows:
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
when he intentionally interferes with a person
recognized to be a law enforcement officer seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself
or another regardless of whether there is a legal
basis for the arrest."
This Court has previously held that:
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature
are presumed to be constitutional and valid."
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 175,
97 P. 2d 937 at 939 (1940).
This principle is one from which there is no dissent
in any jurisdiction and the presumption stands in the
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. Moruzzi
v. Federal Life and Casualty Co., 45 N. M. 35, 75 P. 2d
320 at 326 (1938).
Appellant bases his constitutional challenge on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and on Article 1, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, which
states:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated. And no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized."
Appellant claims that his guaranteed right against
unreasonable seizure is violated by Section 76-8-305 since
it makes unlawful any interference regardless of whether
there is a legal basis for the arrest or detention.
This statute does not take away any of appellant's
rights. It does not make lawful an unreasonable intrusion. His rights remain intact. The statute's only effect
is to diminate the remedy of self-help. Its purpose is
to promote a peaceful and orderly administration of
justice. The suspect's remedy if he thinks he has been
unlawfully arrested or detained is in the courts, not the
streets.
"A new principle of right conduct has been
espoused. It is argued that if a peace officer is
making an illegal arrest but is not using force,
the remedy of the citizen should be that of
suing the officer for false arrest, not resistance
with force. The legality of a peaceful arrest
may frequently be a close question. It is a question more properly determined by courts than
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by participant in what may be a highly emotional situation . . . It is not too much to ask
that one believing himself unlawfullly arrested
should submit to the officer and thereafter seek
his legal remedies in court." Miller v. Alaska,
462 P. 2d 421 at 426 (Alaska, 1969). (Emphasis
added.)
Of course, requirement of peaceful submission to
arrest or detention, lawful or unlawful, has no application to the right to resist excessive force. People v. Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233 (1969). If life or
limb is threatened, counter-active force is justifiable.
However, where only a threat to liberty is posed (as
was the situation in the present case), resistance is not
expedient. Resolution lies within the system. Gray v.
State, 463 P. 2d 897 at 908 (Alaska, 1970).
A similar statute enacted in California in 1957 (taken
almost verbatim from the Uniform Arrest Act) was construed to apply to resistance of unlawful as well as lawful
arrests, and was upheld. People v. Curtis, supra at 236.
That court considered the background of the common
law right to resistance of an unlawful arrest and found
that it is no longer a necessary safeguard against unreasonable seizure. Elimination of that right is not a
deprivation of liberty.
"We conclude the state in removing the
right to resist does not contribute to or effectuate this deprivation of liberty . . . Thus self-help
as a practical remedy is anachronistic, whatever
may have been its original justification or effiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cacy in an era when common law doctrine permitting resistance evolved . . . Accordingly, the
state, in deleting the light to resist, has not
actually altered or diminished the remedies
available against the illegality of an arrest without probable cause; it has merely required a
person to submit peacefully to the inevitable
and to pursue his available remedies through
the orderly judicial process . . . There is no constitutional impediment to the state's policy of
removing controversies over the legality of
arrest from the streets to 'the courtroom." People v. Curtis, 74 Gal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233,
236-237 (1969).
POINT III.
APPELLANT'S INTERFERENCE WITH A
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL SEEKING TO AFFECT AN ARREST OR DETENTION WAS A VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-8-305 (1953), AS AMENDED,
WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST WAS
LAWFUL.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953), as amended,
provides:
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
when he intentionally interferes with a person
recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking to affect an arrest or detention of himself or
another regardless of whether there is a legal
brsis for the arrest."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Three criteria must be met for a violation of the above
statute:
1. The accused must intentionally interfere with
an officer's action.
2. The accused must recognize the person to be a
law enforcement officer.
3. The officer must be seeking to arrest or detain
the accused or another person.
In the instant case, all three requirements were
present.
1. Officer Cox attempted to stop the appellant in his
vehicle, for suspected violation of the traffic laws. First,
he pursued Mr. Bradshaw in his patrol car with red
light flashing. Next, he attempted to write out a citation. Finally, he was forced to again pursue the appellant, with siren blaring.
2. Mr. Bradshaw did recognize or should have recognized that Officer Cox was a law enforcement official.
He was dressed in full uniform and was driving a patrol
car well marked with the official city police emblem and
familiar red light on top. Mr. Bradshaw knew Officer
Cox personally and should have recognized him in his
professional capacity.
3. Recognizing that an officer of the law was seeking to arrest, or at least detain him, Mr. Bradshaw intentionally interfered with such action. He took no heed
of the patrol car pursuing him. He did not pull over or
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make any attempt to do so. When Officer Cox was in
the process of writing a citation Mr. Bradshaw drove
away from the Officer in his own vehicle. When Officer
Cox followed him again, this time with his siren blaring,
Mr. Bradshaw continued to ignore the law and again
failed to pull over to the side of the road. After Officer
Cox followed Mr. Bradshaw to his residence, and informed him that he was under arrest, Mr. Bradshaw
approached Officer Cox, placed his hand on the officer's
chest, and shoved hdm backwards. He then turned his
back and walked away from the officer.
Appellant claims that the attempted detention and
arrest were unlawful and that his interference was therefore permissible. The statute clearly provides contra.
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
. . . regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(1953), as amended. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant also claims that an officer has no duty
to make an unlawful arrest. This is true. People v.
Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P. 2d 233 (1969). But
under Section 76-8-305, "duty" is not an issue. Former
statutes, repealed by the 1973 legislature concerned conduct of an officer engaged in his official duties. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953), as amended; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1953), as amended. The cases
of Lopez and Hurley, quoted by appellant on the issue
of duty, pertain to those statutes and are not applicable
in the instant case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT IV.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Appellant contends that the state did not meet its
burden of showing probable cause for arrest and that
the trial court therefore erred in not taking the case
from the jury.
A violation of Section 76-8-305 does not require the
showing of probable cause. It is applicable to any interference '"regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest." Section 76-8-305. Probable cause is only
significant where the validity of the arrest is in question.
Even if this was the controUing issue, probable cause is
determined by standards of reasonableness and "it is
primarily the responsibility of the trial court to determine the quesition of reasonableness and to rule upon
admissibility of evidence; his rulings are indulged with
a presumption of correctness and they should not be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error."
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P. 2d 534 at 536
(1973).
The facts of the case support a finding by the trial
court of probable cause and do not as appellant contends,
present a case of clear error on the part of that court.
Appellant contends that his attempted arrest or detention by Officer Cox was a "seizure" within the defini-
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tion of the fourth amendment. But, this being true, does
not make it per se unconstitutional. The fourth amendment forbids only unreasonable seizures. "The test to
be applied on the question as to whether there has been
a violation of the constitutional rights referred to above,
is one of reasonableness." Torres, supra.
Some Courts hold that an officer's mere stopping
of a moving vehicle constitutes an arrest. Robertson v.
State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S. W. 633 (1947). Others regard this as an accosting or detention. State v. Williams,
237 S. a . 252, 116 S. E. 2d 858 (1960). Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-1 (1953), defines arrest as:
". . . the taking of a person into custody
in a case and in a manner authorized by law.
. . ." (Emphasis added.)
State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 10 P. 2d 1073 (1932),
listed the basic elements of an arrest. These expressly
included notice of legal custody. Pulling a vehicle over
to the sid3 of the road, without more, is not "the taking
of a person into custody" as in an arrest situation. It
is a mere shopping or detention for investigatory purposes.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968),
the Supreme Court announced the standard for determining the reasonableness of a detention or stop:
" . . . a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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possible criminal behaviour, even though there
is no probable cause for arrest."
Numerous court decisions have held that police stops
need not be founded on probable cause. In State v.
Coleman, 254 Or. 1, 465 P. 2d 67 (1969), the Oregon
Supreme Court held that an officer's stopping of an automobile to determine the identity of the occupant and the
vehicle was not an arrest, and could be made without
probable cause. The Count of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has consistently held that probable cause is not
required to stop automobiles. United States v. Sadler,
458 F. 2d 906 (10th Cir. 1972). In Adams v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972), the Supreme Court
said:
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to momentarily maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, may be most reasonable in
light of the facts known to the officer at the
time."
If it is considered that pulling a vehicle over to the side
of the road is not an arrest, but rather a detention, then
no standard of probable cause is required. Hence, the
state cannot have failed in its burden to prove such. If
the stopping of the vehicle is viewed as an arrest, a different standard is applicable.
The standard for arrest is probable cause defined
in terms of "facts and circumstances within [the arresting
officer's] knowledge and of which he had reasonably
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trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense/' Beck v. Ohio,
379 U. S. 89 at 91, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964).
Officer Cox was advised over his radio that Mr. Bradshaw's license had been suspended and under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-28 (1953), operating a vehicle under such
circumstances is unlawful. Seeing the defand'ant driving
down the main street of town, Officer Cox therefore followed him.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3(1) (1953), as amended,
provides that a peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant for a public offense committed in his presence. Officer Cox had reason to believe that such was
the case; that a public offense, i.e«, a violation of the
traffic laws, was being committed in his piresence. He
therefore followed Mr. Bradshaw in the prescribed official manner (with red light flashing) in an attempt
to make a stop.
Officer Cox subsequently discovered that Mr. Bradshaw's license had not actually been suspended. But
this fact does not obviate the basis for the stop in the
first place. Probable cause to arrest means less than
evidence which would justify conviction.
"While the requirement is not satisfied
merely by a showing of good faith, neither does
it go to the other extreme and require that he
be sure of evidence that will establish guilt."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772
at 775 (1969).
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical consaderiations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949).
Officer Cox proceeded on information he reasonably
believed to be accurate. As it turns out, he was mistaken, but his acts were in "good faith" and "within
standards of decent and decorous behavior." Torres at
336.
"Because many situations which confront
officers are more or less ambiguous, room must
b* allowed for some mistakes on their part. But
the mistakes must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts lending sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar at 1311.
If probable cause to arrest required proof positive
or some such stricter standard, the hands of the police
would be tied. There authority to question and investigate would be effectively destroyed. Recognizing that
the interests of the individual to be free from unwarranted intrusion by the government and the interests of
the police in fulfilling their function in an ordered society, the legislators and the courts have reached a compronBS3,
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"The essential thing is to keep within the
reasonable middle ground, between protecting
of the law abiding citizenry from high-handed
or officious intrustions into their private affairs and the imposing of undue restrictions
upon conscientious officers doing their duty in
the investigation of coime." State v. Criscola,
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 at 519 (1968).
The standard set, by which to judge the actions of
the government, is reasonableness:
"Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on the scene assessment of probable cause
prrides legal justification for arresting a person
suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take *jhe administrative steps incident
to arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S. Ct. 854 at
862-3 (1975).
Officer Cox's assessment of the situation should not
be lightly disregarded. He acted on facts and information which he believed to be true, and which justified
his belief in appellant's guilt. He acted in good faith,
not arbitrarily, or without justification. On these facts
the trial court had sufficient basis for its findings and
its determination should not be overturned. Officer Cox
had probable cause and the attempted arrest of Richard
Bradshaw was lawful.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's interference with a law enforcement official's action was a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
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305 (1953), as amended, and his conviction thereunder
should be upheld as the statute does not deprive him
of any constitutional rights.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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